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Games: Agency as Art is wonderful, and in my opinion the most important 
book in the philosophy of games since Bernard Suits’ The Grasshopper. In 
effect, Nguyen takes Suits’ idea of ‘reverse English’, develops it into a full- 
blown theory of ‘striving play’ and then runs with it. And boy does he run with 
it! The concept of striving play in Nguyen’s hands turns out to be incredibly 
powerful. By shining a light on the distinctive aesthetics of agency, it avoids 
assimilating the aesthetics of games to more familiar aesthetic values. It helps 
explain how games can enhance our autonomy, provide relief from morality, 
transform competition into cooperation and illuminates some of the dangers 
of ‘gamification’. Because I think Nguyen’s approach is fundamentally right- 
headed, I will not try to refute his theory or pick various nits about the details. 
Rather, my aim is to help build and enhance the theory. Nguyen’s book paints 
an impressive mosaic, but he omitted one crucial element: playfulness. 
Incorporating the idea of the ‘playful stance’ into Nguyen’s theory promises 
to resolve three otherwise troubling tensions. I begin by laying out the three 
tensions (section 1), then introduce the idea of playfulness (section 2) and 
explain how this idea can mitigate these tensions (section 3).
Three tensions
The three tensions laid out in this section have a common source in the way 
in which striving play can be intensely immersive, narrowly focused and goal- 
oriented. The first tension is between striving play and aesthetic appreciation 
of it. Nguyen himself does an excellent job of laying out this tension, which 
arises between the apparent need for a disinterested attitude and the inten-
sely practical, focused and hence ‘interested’ attitude associated with striving 
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play. The idea that aesthetic appreciation requires a disinterested attitude is 
usually traced to Kant, but the idea is unfortunately multiply ambiguous. We 
can, however, leave delicate issues of Kant scholarship to one side here and 
rely instead on Nguyen’s own account of the relevant notion of disinterest.
Nguyen endorses Bence Nanay’s account of aesthetic experience, which 
he considers an improvement on a similar view developed by Jerome Stolnitz, 
suggesting that Nanay’s account overcomes some objections from Dickie ‘in 
a convincing way’ (Nguyen 2020, 118, n10). I cannot do justice to Nanay’s 
account here, but the core idea is that a paradigmatic form of aesthetic 
experience is constituted by a specific pattern of attention. In this sort of 
aesthetic experience, our attention is focused with regards to objects, but 
distributed with regards to properties (Nanay 2016, 24). Consider the aesthetic 
appreciation of a landscape. Here your attention is focused on the landscape, 
but your attention is distributed with regards to the properties of the land-
scape, taking in many of its properties at once. Nanay suggests that this 
synoptic vision captures ‘the original Kantian importance of disinterest in our 
aesthetic experiences’ (Nanay 2016, 26). Whenever we have some practical 
end in view, we will tend to focus our attention on properties relevant to our 
end. If, I were to view the landscape with an eye to making a hasty escape 
then I would focus on the paths and where they lead rather than the majestic 
hills. Aesthetic experience is thus unfocused and unfiltered (by practical 
interests).
How is this in tension with striving play in Nguyen’s sense? In striving play, 
although we may not reflectively consider our end valuable, we do really 
pursue it. In striving play we therefore impose a practical filter on our atten-
tion. We attend to what will help us win: ‘I do not focus on the look or odour 
of my Chess pieces’ (Nguyen 2020, 118). Since our attention is focused and 
practically filtered, it is incompatible with the sort of disinterest essential for 
the kinds of experiences apparently essential for aesthetic experience. Hence 
the tension between striving play and aesthetic appreciation of our agency.
Nguyen suggest that we can mitigate this tension by shifting perspec-
tives – we ‘zoom in’ and ‘zoom out’ (Nguyen 2020, 117–119). The emerging 
picture is one on which our aesthetic experience of our agency will often be 
retrospective, as we imaginatively remember what it was like to find just the 
right foothold when climbing that rock. This is not an ideal resolution of the 
tension. It puts too much distance between the actual experiences and one’s 
aesthetic appreciation of them. What if my memory is poor? I will not 
remember just what it was like when I found that nice chess combination, 
everything that went through my head. Moreover, memory, even when 
reliable, tends to be less vivacious and vibrant than an immediate second- 
order experience had simultaneously with one’s practical activity.
A second tension arises between the goods of some forms of ‘gamification’ 
and the rich structure of any plausible conception of our real-world values. 
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This is what Nguyen calls the problem of ‘value capture’. Gamification brings 
game-like feature to practical situations and uses their motivational power to 
encourage people to engage in desirable but unpleasant behaviour when 
they might otherwise lack sufficient motivation to get the job done. The 
behaviour can be good for the agent, as with fitness devices like ‘fitbit’. 
Nguyen argues that the very features that make striving play valuable in 
the context of proper games makes it dangerous in the context of gamifica-
tion. In the real world our values are and should be rich and subtle. However, 
one of the attractions of games is that they provide very clear-cut goals – 
checkmate, scoring more baskets, etc. The ‘value capture’ worry is that more 
simplistic value schemes will displace our more rich, subtle value schemes in 
the real world. Number of steps taken will displace a more plausible concep-
tion of fitness, for example. Further, our values are not pre-established, and 
a gamified life may dispose us to endorse simpler values. Moreover, the very 
reasons gamified systems are motivationally efficacious also make the values 
they embed ‘sticky’. The game-like pleasures of achievement, ‘levelling up’ 
can be habit-forming or even addictive, displacing our better judgment. We 
also suffer from ‘heuristic drift’ – when we treat something as a useful 
heuristic for long enough we can come to treat is as an end in itself.
A third tension arises between striving play (and game play more gener-
ally) on the one hand and autonomy on the other. Nguyen argues that 
striving play can enhance our autonomy by making possible forms of activity 
which otherwise are impossible. Without the rules of chess, we cannot castle 
or execute the bishop and knight checkmate. He argues against those who 
think that games inherently limit our autonomy by imposing rules. Moreover, 
if we play a variety of kinds of games then we can become skilled in a variety 
of forms of agency and skilled in fluidly moving between them in our real 
lives in ways that enhance autonomy.
In arguing that striving play can enhance our autonomy, Nguyen criticizes 
Miguel Sicart, who thinks that we find true freedom only outside the limita-
tions of rules, including game rules. Sicart’s view seems to be that we find real 
freedom only in unstructured play – play that is ‘carnivalesque and appro-
priative’ (Nguyen 2020, 74). Nguyen offers a compelling rejoinder to Sicart by 
emphasizing the ways in which the rules of games make possible whole 
forms of agency that would otherwise forever elude us, and this in itself 
significantly enhances our autonomy. Even so, there seems to be something 
in Sicart’s view that is worth preserving. Striving play as such can easily 
become obsessive in ways that threaten their autonomy. Consider, e.g., 
McGonigal’s discussion of David Sudnow’s total immersion in the old Atari 
videogame, Breakout:
As Sudnow put it, ‘Here’s all the motivation you’d ever want . . . and the prize 
seemed to be just holding on’. The game completely sustained his attention, 
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even when he wasn’t in front of the Atari console. ‘When I wasn’t at the TV, I was 
practicing the sequence in my imagination, walking down the street, sitting in 
a café twirling a salt shaker, looking up during dinner in a Japanese restaurant at 
a bamboo and rice paper trellis with Breakout-like rectangles on the ceiling . . . 
just waiting to get back to the game’. (McGonigal 2012, 40)
McGonigal herself seems strangely oblivious to the impoverishment of 
Sudnow’s autonomy, but most readers will see this at least partly as 
a cautionary tale. An inspiration for the account defended here is that 
a more playful approach might help with this. Sicart goes too far in insisting 
on unstructured play, but he is onto something in suggesting that we need to 
remain playful to preserve our autonomy.
The playful stance
In filling out his view, Nguyen lays out three stances:
(1) The play stance, in which one is actively playing a game.
(2) The spectator stance, in which one surveys a game or part of a game.
(3) The design stance, in which one attends to the design of the game 
itself – its rules, goals, graphics, pieces, how they cohere, what sort of 
play they enable, etc.
Nguyen’s theory would benefit from the inclusion of a fourth stance:
(1) The playful stance, in which one is poised for playful activity.
Superficially, the playful stance might seem redundant with the play stance, 
but it is not. In Nguyen’s sense, the ‘play stance’ is to do with playing games. 
One can be playing a game without thereby being playful. More generally, 
there is a sense of ‘play’ in which playing neither entails nor is entailed by 
playing a game. A child frolicking on a hill is playing, as we might say, ‘full- 
stop’, but not playing a game. A jaded footballer who is in it just for the 
money and reputation is still playing a game when he plays football, but he is 
not playing full-stop any more. He has lost his love of the game, and is no 
longer playful. Similarly, someone who is very intensely focused on their 
immediate goal can be playing a game without thereby being the least bit 
playful. On the one hand, one can play a game, play a joke on someone, play 
the guitar or play someone for a fool. On the other hand, one can simply play, 
without playing anything; one can play full-stop. When one plays full-stop, 
one’s behaviour is animated by a playful spirit. It is this notion of playfulness 
that figures in the ‘playful stance’. To avoid confusion, we might usefully 
relabel Nguyen’s ‘play stance’ as the ‘gaming stance’. In what, though, do play 
full-stop and playfulness consist? I have explored this topic in depth 
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elsewhere (see Ridge forthcoming), but I cannot go into all the details of that 
theory here. I will, however, touch on some of the core ideas.
Here is my view of play full-stop:
An agent is playing [full-stop] just in case the agent is engaged in unscripted 
activity for the fun of it.
An activity is scripted to the extent that the agent’s behaviour is fixed by 
some pre-existing ‘script’. Being scripted comes in multiple forms. An 
action done entirely by following a rule which fixes one’s behaviour 
throughout the activity is scripted. Someone working on an assembly line 
who follows simple rules for combining parts is following a script. The 
behaviour of an animal whose activity is entirely fixed by instinct is 
scripted; here the instinct is the script. An action done out of strict moral 
principle is scripted. To be unscripted is simply not to be scripted. One 
important worry for present purposes is that being unscripted might seem 
to preclude playing games of any kind, since games have rules and these 
could be understood as a kind of ‘script’. However, one can be playful 
without being open to absolutely anything like the Joker from Batman. Two 
points are essential here. First: simply being rule-governed does not mean 
one’s behaviour is entirely fixed by rules. Plausibly, play is implicitly 
a graded concept – to play is to be playful to a sufficient degree, where 
‘sufficient’ is fixed by a context of utterance. While rules exclude certain 
choices, they typically leave discretion. The more discretion they leave, 
ceteris paribus, the less scripted the behaviour and thus the more scope 
for play.
Second: To constitute a ‘script’ a rule or set of rules must have certain 
further features. The rule or set of rules must either be (a) externally imposed, 
e.g. by coercion or hardwired biological instinct, or (b) taken by the agent to 
be binding in some way, as with moral norms, a sense of propriety, profes-
sional duty, etiquette, etc. So a rule one chooses for oneself and which one 
takes not to be binding – that is, which one takes it to be permissible to 
abandon on a mere fleeting whim – does not constitute a ‘script’ in the 
intended sense. So many of the rules governing play will not constitute 
a script precisely because the rules are not considered binding. Of course, 
when people play together there can be a tacit social contract. In a multi- 
player game no individual can permissibly abandon the agreed rules on 
a whim, at least not in the sense of violating – though one may of course 
resign and just quit playing (sometimes this will spoil the game for the others, 
though). Still all of those playing together can abandon those rules if all (or 
enough) of them ‘just feel like it’. This differs from moral and legal obligations; 
there is a sense in which the group agent can still abandon the rules on 
a whim. This, incidentally, is why play full-stop is not the same as unstructured 
play. Play full-stop can be unstructured, but it needn’t be. Sicart’s emphasis 
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on unstructured play is onto something because unstructured play is always 
play full-stop, but mistaken because the entailment does not go both ways.
What about doing something ‘for the fun of it’? It is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for doing something ‘for the fun of it’ that one self-consciously 
sets oneself the aim of having some fun, judges that a given activity will be 
fun, and does it for that reason. Doing something ‘for the fun of it’ in the 
intended sense should instead be understood in terms of the behaviour 
actually being fun, where the fun reinforces the behaviour. This of course, 
leads naturally to the question of just what fun is, though. In my view (which 
I cannot properly defend here), fun is a homeostatic cluster of affective/ 
motivational/perceptual states. These states are themselves characteristi-
cally caused by certain sorts of inputs. Having fun is a state with the 
following functional profile:
Characteristic inputs:
(a) A perception that one’s environment is safe and a general sense of 
satiety/satisfaction
(b) A lack of anxiety
(c) Perception of some aspect of one’s environment as incongruous in 
some way, perhaps especially but not exclusively in seeing something 
novel in the mundane
Characteristic outputs:
(a) Enjoyment of the aspect of one’s environment that one finds incon-
gruous, etc.
(b) A tendency to ‘lose oneself’ in the phenomenon, to lose track of time 
and more mundane matters
(c) Amusement, laughter, etc.
(d) The inhibition of more negative emotions
(e) Positive forms of arousal
(f) An increase in openness to one’s environment – a broadening of 
perspective which in turn may prime one for creativity
What unifies the seemingly disparate elements of this functional package is, 
roughly, that fun functions to motivate experimental behaviour in safe envir-
onments. No element in this cluster may be essential to a given instance 
counting as fun. However, there must be enough of the general ‘package’ 
picked out by this homeostatic cluster for something to count as fun. This way 
of defining ‘fun’ helps clarify why play and fun are made for one another. Play 
is unscripted precisely because the point of play is to seek out something 
novel, while having fun is paradigmatically a matter of seeing something as 
novel.
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Closely related: play broadens our perspective. Having fun differs from more 
negative feelings like fear and disgust, in that it does not program for 
a specific behavioural response (e.g. fear programs for flight). Barbara 
Fredrickson argues that this is a general feature of positive emotions. 
Because positive emotions are not responses to problems, they do not cue 
behaviours specifically for solving a problem. Rather, positive emotions serve 
to broaden a creature’s ‘thought-action repertoire’, where this enhances the 
creature’s long-term fitness by developing more flexible strategies. Whereas 
a perceived threat narrows one’s perspective, the perception of safety can 
broaden one’s perspective and encourage the agent to ‘discard time-tested or 
automatic (everyday) behavioural scripts and to pursue novel, creative, and 
often unscripted paths of thought and action’ (Fredrickson 1998, 5, emphasis 
added). When we are playful, we take in more of our situation, and in 
particular notice new affordances – opportunities for action – in light of 
features of the situation we might have missed with a narrower perspective, 
and this in turn helps us find creative new solutions. This highlights a contrast 
between certain intense pleasures (orgasm, heroin high) which narrow our 
focus and fun, which broadens it.
Lightening up: having fun and resolving the tensions
The playful stance enriches Nguyen’s theory quite apart from helping resolve 
the tensions, simply because play and fun plausibly are good for their own 
sake and one of the main reasons we play games. Nguyen himself mentions 
fun in passing as the point of most ‘stupid games’, but they are also important 
to party games that are not stupid games in his technical sense, many 
informal card and board games and even many of the so-called ‘heavy 
strategy games’ Nguyen mentions. In fact, pure striving play is much easier 
in ‘stupid games’ like Bag on Your Head precisely because they encourage 
a relaxed, playful attitude. By contrast with more serious competitive games 
like chess, it is much harder not to become invested in the outcome so that 
we at best have a hybrid form of game play, with elements of both achieve-
ment play and striving play.1 In what follows, I focus on chess as a test case, 
both because most people are familiar with it and because its intensity might 
seem to make it especially inhospitable to ‘the playful stance’.
Nguyen argued that our practical interest when engaged in striving play 
tends to make our second-order perceptions skew towards the practically 
relevant. One problem with this argument is that we often do not know, in 
advance, precisely which features are practically relevant. To that extent, it is 
trivial to filter out the ‘irrelevant’ features in advance. Granted, some features 
can be safely ignored, like the smell of the chess pieces, but this level of 
‘filtration’ need not mean one’s experience cannot be aesthetic. Focus comes 
in degrees. If I am focused on precisely one property then my experience is 
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maximally focused and presumably non-aesthetic. However, surely my per-
ception need not be so capacious as to focus on every property of the object 
of experience to be aesthetic. Indeed, depending on how liberal we are with 
properties, such a capacious ‘focus’ may typically be impossible for creatures 
like us. So long as we are focusing on several properties of the object and not 
just one, our experience could to that extent be aesthetic. Often there will be 
a proper subset of all the properties of the object of experience which are 
candidates for being practically relevant, only some of which merit our 
attention. Crucially, we often cannot know until we look.
Of course, if aesthetic experience requires that we impose no practical filter 
of any kind on our experience then the mere fact that focus comes in degrees 
will not help resolve the tension between striving play and aesthetic experi-
ence. It is here, though, that an interesting possibility arises. We might take up 
a genuinely disinterested perspective for the sake of a second-order practical 
interest. Although not quite literally striving play, this indirection involves 
a kind of agential fluidity which is similar in spirit. We might notice things 
which we will immediately recognize as practically relevant even though our 
perspective is disinterested right up until the moment of our epiphany. For 
example, I might canvass a ‘Where’s Wally?’ image in a disinterested way with 
the not unreasonable hope that if my eyes happened to pass over Wally that 
this would jump out at me even as I lazily scan the page. An experienced 
chess player might take a similar approach to the position in front of them.
Taking up a more disinterested perspective will not be trivial for earnest 
striving players. It is all too easy in the ‘heat of battle’ to become obsessed 
with one idea and fall into tunnel vision. In chess, this characteristically 
happens when the player finds a very nice idea and becomes convinced it 
just must work. The player then spends enormous amounts of time trying to 
make it work when at some point they should instead have realized that the 
move just gone back to the drawing board to find more candidate moves. 
What they need is the ability to shift perspectives from a calculative mode 
into a more imaginative mode, where the latter could be enhanced by a more 
disinterested survey of the position – the ‘Where’s Wally’ approach to finding 
ideas/moves. Crucially, the playful stance is the perfect antidote to tunnel 
vision. Recall that playfulness functions to encourage experimentation and new 
ideas. Moreover, playfulness achieves this function by giving us a broader and 
more wide-ranging perspective.
One might object that while playfulness enables a kind of aesthetic 
experience in games, it is not the right kind of aesthetic experience. For 
Nguyen, it is crucial that the appropriate object of aesthetic experience, at 
least those truly distinctive of games, is our agency. What my playful chess 
player aesthetically surveys, it seems, is not their own agency, but ‘the 
position’ or ‘their situation’. This contrast is easily overdrawn, though. 
When an experienced chess player surveys a position, they do not see it 
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primarily in terms of the shape or color of the pieces, but instead in terms 
of its affordances – its possible moves – a point Nguyen himself makes 
(Nguyen 2020, 138). Seeing a position is therefore seeing a set of oppor-
tunities for one’s agency, which is not a million miles from experiencing 
one’s own actual agency. Moreover, even if it is not technically the 
aesthetics of agency in Nguyen’s sense, it is a form of aesthetic experience 
very distinctive of playing games. A chess player will appreciate a position 
aesthetically in a very different way from someone who does not know 
the rules of the game, and their appreciation will be very ‘agential’ in the 
sense of seeing it in terms of the potential moves hidden within it.
However, we can do better than this. When playing a game of chess 
and entering a playful mode, the player will pivot from the position in 
front of them to a series of possible moves. They can then take 
a disinterested attitude to each of those possible moves, playfully taking 
in an unfocused way all the features of the move – what lines of attack it 
opens up, what pieces it threatens, what weaknesses it leaves behind, 
what new affordances it provides the opponent. This is a very cerebral 
form of unfocused attention, but it is unfocused attention all the same. 
Moreover, it is unfocused attention to a possible move as represented in 
the player’s imagination. This, though, is a form of agency – mental 
agency – by the player. Moving a piece ‘in your head’ is a species of 
agency just as much as moving it on a physical board, and it had better be 
given the possibility of blindfold chess. This sort of unfocused experience 
of one’s mental agency, then can generate aesthetic enjoyment of possible 
moves – of their harmony and elegance, of the surprising ideas they 
contain, even of their hilarity in some cases. Insofar as playfulness helps 
us achieve this, it enhances the aesthetics of agency during one’s striving 
play.
What of the second tension: between striving play (especially in worth-
while forms of gamification) and preserving a rich and subtle set of values in 
the real world? How can the playful stance help us avoid the ‘stickiness’ of the 
simplistic values embedded in gamification? As Nguyen urges, what we really 
need to avoid value capture is the ability to keep things in perspective. We 
need to ‘dip in and out’ (Nguyen 2020, 224) of different agencies so we do not 
lose track of what is important. However, this is easier said than done, given 
the motivational power of striving play – recall again the obsessiveness of 
Sudnow regarding Breakout. The playful stance is perfect for helping us keep 
perspective. First, the playful person has a broader perspective. This is one of 
the functions of playfulness – it makes us take a step back and have a broader, 
more synoptic perspective. This act of reflection can remind us of why we are 
engaged in the activity in the first place. It can therefore remind us that, for 
example, steps on our Fitbit are just a heuristic, and what we really value is 
our health.
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Second, playfulness requires a sense of safety and a lack of anxiety – these 
are among the input states in the functional account of having fun I offered in 
section 2. This serenity and sense of safety is not automatic, though. What sort 
of player can maintain such an even keel in the heat of battle? One who takes 
a broader perspective on the real point of their activity and its role in their life. 
When stressing out because you might lose their game, the playful competitor 
will say to themselves, ‘it is just a game’, or ‘the important thing is to play well 
and learn something from my mistakes’, or simply ‘just enjoy the process’. 
These thoughts, though, exemplify just the kind of reflective perspective one 
needs to avoid value capture. The playful stance, then, encourages reflection 
of the right kind simply because without it one will be too anxious and feel too 
unsafe to remain playful. The virtue of playfulness can be cultivated, and we 
cultivate it in part by learning to keep things in perspective.
What, finally, of the third tension: between playing games and autonomy? 
To some extent, this tension arose because of the problems associated with 
value capture and its erosion of the reasons-responsiveness that partly con-
stitutes autonomy on some theories. I have already explained how playfulness 
provides an antidote to that problem. Playfulness also bolsters the mechanism 
by which striving play enhances our autonomy on Nguyen’s account. Nguyen’s 
idea is that playing a variety of games gives us a library of agencies, and this 
gives us more options in real life. For this to enhance our autonomy effectively, 
though, we need to be motivated to move fluidly between agencies in light of 
what makes most sense in our circumstances. This agential fluidity is enhanced 
by playfulness. Being playful means experimenting with new approaches, 
which can mean new agencies in a familiar situation, e.g. bringing some of 
the forms of agency developed in playing chess to the practice of philosophy. 
Someone who is more playful will be more imaginative and more open to 
these opportunities to ‘try on’ new agencies.
However, playfulness contributes to our freedom and autonomy in a more 
direct way. The primary function of play is to encourage experimentation – to 
try something new. The playful chess player will not simply opt to grind out 
a technical win, repeating ideas that have been deployed over and over – at 
least, they will not automatically do this. They will instead scan the position to 
look for new ideas. Because play encourages experimentation, they will look 
for ways to ‘break the rules’ – here not the constitutive rules (they aren’t 
cheaters!) but the strategic rules of thumb that inform their play, e.g. ‘a knight 
on the rim is dim’. Playfulness is thus transgressive and generates an exhilar-
ating sense of freedom.
Conclusion
Nguyen comes tantalizingly close to a solution like mine to the three tensions 
in the final paragraph of his book:
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Often associated with the notion of ‘play’ are the qualities of lightness, unser-
iousness, changeability. And there is a sense in which the suggestions I’ve made 
about striving play fit with that notion. When we are involved in striving play, 
especially aesthetic striving play, we are learning to wear our agency lightly. We 
are learning not to be stuck in a certain practical frame of mind, not too 
attached to certain clear goals. We [are] learning to dip in and out, to devote 
ourselves and then to pull back. We are learning to play around with our own 
practical attitudes. We are learning to be more light-footed with our way of 
being in the practical world. (Nguyen 2020, 224)
Here Nguyen is very close to the ideas embodied in the playful stance but 
does not quite ‘go there’. In a way, my main point in this paper is that striving 
play as such is not sufficient for the sort of light-footedness Nguyen cele-
brates here. Striving play is compatible with obsessiveness, tunnel vision and 
wearing one’s (sub-)agency heavily. If, however, we combine striving play 
with play full-stop then we can have the best of both worlds.
Note
1. I explore this theme at length and argue that some ideas from Stoicism can help 
provide a more realistic ideal of game play for earnest competitors in Ridge 
(2021).
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